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Right-Wing Waves: Applying the Four Waves Theory to 
Transnational and Transhistorical Right-Wing Threat Trends
Amber Hart
Victoria University, Institute for Sustainable Industries & Liveable Cities, Victoria, Australia
ABSTRACT
The increasing global prominence of right-wing extremism and terrorism has 
been noted by scholars and government agencies alike. While right-wing 
terrorism has been documented throughout postwar history, groups have 
evolved, resulting in diverse materializations of violence perpetrated on 
behalf of varying ideologies and perceived threats. This paper draws upon 
Campion’s research into Australian right-wing extremism and terrorism, 
where three ideological threat narratives were identified. The aim of this 
research was to determine the applicability of Rapoport’s ‘wave’ theory to 
the international evolution of extreme right-wing activity. In doing so, 
Campion’s framework is utilized and a case study analysis undertaken, inves-
tigating anti-communist, anti-immigration and anti-Islamic rhetoric on 
a transnational and transhistorical basis. It is argued that waves are found 
internationally, and that Rapoport’s model is therefore applicable to the 
right-wing milieu. The paper concludes that the extreme right is on the 
cusp of the next wave and discusses trends that may inform those in 
a position to counteract the forthcoming wave of activity. There remains 
a need for law enforcement and security agencies to monitor right-wing 
extremism and terrorism activity to remain attuned to the ever-evolving 




Rapoport’s wave theory; 
Right-wing terrorism
Introduction
The increasingly transnational nature of right-wing extremism and terrorism has been noted by 
scholars and government agencies alike. While right-wing terrorism has been documented throughout 
history, groups and ideologies have evolved, resulting in diverse materializations of violence perpe-
trated on behalf of varying ideologies and perceived threats. A greater understanding of cycles and 
patterns throughout the history of right-wing extremism and terrorism is necessary to counteract the 
threat that terrorist and extremist groups may pose in the future as varied manifestations continue to 
proliferate on an international scale. In an attempt to understand these patterns, Campion’s Australian 
three-phase framework1 will be applied on an international scale to argue that Rapoport’s ‘wave’ 
theory2 can be utilized to describe the evolution of the extreme-right over the past 70 years. Campion 
proposes three periods of extreme right-wing activity in Australia, informed by perceived threats from 
Bolshevik communism, pluralism and immigration, and ethnic Australians and the Muslim commu-
nity. It is hypothesized that the dominant threat perceptions that informed the extreme right in 
Australia, as identified by Campion, will be observed internationally in response to a varying socio- 
political context.3 To investigate this hypothesis, the paper first introduces Campion’s research, before 
employing a case study analysis with a focus on the American and European contexts. Instances of 
violence and extremism are utilized to demonstrate corresponding dominant threat narratives inter-
nationally in applying Rapoport’s ‘wave’ theory. It is argued that following international events which 
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serve as catalysts, as well as national and international political experiences, much of the extreme right 
has perpetrated violence in a cyclical fashion in response to the identified perceived threats. The paper 
also argues that white supremacist, neo-Nazi and anti-Semitic narratives are consistent themes 
underlying the phases of activity. The paper concludes that the extreme right is on the cusp of the 
next wave and discusses trends that may inform identification of the evolving perceived threat or 
threats relevant to the forthcoming wave of right-wing extremism and terrorism.
Literature review
Over the past few decades, Islamist extremist terrorism has caused the largest number of deaths globally;4 
a focus within the academia on this particular phenomenon is observed, likely as the result of the devastating 
September 11 attacks.5 However, a growing transnational threat posed by the extreme right,6 highlighted by 
the attack in Christchurch, warrants a greater level of academic investigation to understand and prevent 
future atrocities. As argued by Rapoport, “[s]tudents of terrorism . . . focus unduly on contemporary 
events,”7 which has led to a deficiency in relation to research on the transnational and historical scale of 
right-wing extremist and terrorist movements. While there is a significant and ever-growing body of 
research into right-wing terrorism, much of the extant literature relates to a specific era or specific nation; 
there is seemingly a lack of transhistorical, or transnational analysis. Examples include Koehler, who focuses 
specifically on Germany, publishing a book in 2017 analyzing right-wing extremism from the Second World 
War until the discovery of the National Socialist Underground terror cell in 2011.8 Similarly, Belew’s 
research focuses specifically on right-wing extremism and terrorism in the United States of America (U.S. 
A.) post-Vietnam War.9 Kaplan has studied right-wing extremism in North America where he offers 
a typology emphasizing the roles of the community within which certain groups are found; his research 
discusses groups between 1920s Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and the Christian Identity Groups in the early 1990s.10 
Zeskind provides descriptive, first-hand accounts of events across much of that time period.11 In terms of 
historical studies of the extreme right, there is an entire series currently compiled of forty-three titles which 
examine far-right politics and fascism in an historical context.12 However, the focus of this paper is on the 
extreme right, distinct from the far-right on the political spectrum in that it may co-exist with democracy. In 
contrast, Bötticher’s conceptualization argues that the extreme right is inherently anti-democratic, thereby 
precluding its inclusion in conventional politics.13 In terms of Australian research, Dean, Bell and Vakhitova 
provide an overview of the changing narratives since World War II, providing charts related to the 
ideologies espoused by various groups utilizing online data available in 2016.14 Campion provides a more 
comprehensive, descriptive account of Australian right-wing extremist groups throughout a similar time 
period, using historical data as a basis to identify the threat narratives promulgated throughout three 
identified phases of activity.15 Campion’s research is discussed in depth below.
Upon reviewing relevant literature on the historical extreme right, there appears to be a lack of analytical 
synthesis across the different eras of violent political action with consideration of transnational groups, 
narratives, and events. Of specific relevance to this research, Auger investigated whether the right-wing 
violence currently occurring on a transnational scale may be equivalent to a ‘fifth wave’ in accordance with 
Rapoport’s wave concept which is outlined below.16 Auger’s research is significant and unique in that it 
attempts to apply Rapoport’s theory to the literature on right-wing extremism and terrorism.
Rapoport’s ‘wave’ theory is one of the most well known in terrorism studies, with many citing his work, 
and undoubtedly equal numbers of scholars speculating on what the next wave may be.17 While earlier 
versions of Rapoport’s work exist, this paper relies upon the most recently published version, which can be 
found in Horgan and Braddock’s Terrorism Studies: A Reader.18 To test the hypothesis that Rapoport’s 
‘waves’ can adequately explain the evolution of right-wing extremism and terrorism throughout its recent 
history, an understanding of the concept must first be obtained. Rapoport defines a wave as “a cycle of 
activity in a given time period . . . characterized by expansion and contraction phases.”19 He emphasizes that 
each wave of activity is observed internationally, underpinned by common themes, consists of a number of 
groups, is catalyzed by a (generally) international event, and typically lasts for approximately one generation. 
Additionally, use of the descriptor “waves” was purposive in order to articulate that there is not necessarily 
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a definitive start or end point; that each wave is animated by a common issue perceived by various groups, 
and that waves may overlap and groups persist beyond their initial wave. Rapoport argues that various 
elements lead to a decline in a wave, including political dispensations, resistance and a generational shift in 
perspective. Moreover, he argues that tenets may persist throughout each wave; in his research he found that 
nationalism was a persistent feature of all four waves. Importantly, in an earlier version of his work, 
Rapoport states that “local aims are common in all waves, but the crucial fact is that other states are 
simultaneously experiencing similar activities.”20
Many are supportive of Rapoport’s theory; for example, Rosenfeld, who found that Rapoport’s 
model most effectively describes the current data.21 Rasler and Thompson conducted a study which 
confirmed heterogeneous, wave-like behavior that conforms to the Rapoport interpretation.”22 
However, some suggest that the theory overlooks certain features of terrorism. For example, da 
Silva argues that the theory fails to encompass eco-terrorism.23 Additionally, Sitter and Parker argue 
for a new conceptualization of ‘strains’ as opposed to ‘waves.’24 Kaplan, who is convinced that 
Rapoport’s model is sound, provides a critique that the theory fails to account for organizations 
which began at an international level and broke away from the existing terrorist wave, thereby 
becoming local terrorist entities.25 Despite Kaplan’s criticisms, he maintains that his findings do not 
refute the foundational premise of Rapoport’s theory.26
This paper argues that through the case study analysis utilized, Rapoport’s definition and descrip-
tion of a ‘wave’ can be applied on a transnational, transhistorical scale, building on Campion’s 
identification of narrative themes within the extreme right-wing milieu.
An understanding of the historical context of non-state actor terrorism provides a greater appre-
ciation for future activity.27 In seeking to identify patterns across international jurisdictions, which 
may develop a greater appreciation for a theoretical application in other cases, Campion’s findings 
observed in Australia warrant greater application and testing beyond an exclusively Australian 
context. Research such as this may provide new insights into the nature of the ideological justification 
of right-wing extremist and terrorist attacks observed within the extreme right-wing milieu. Moreover, 
Rapoport contends that governments focus primarily on disabling organizations,28 which, in the 
context of the extreme right, becomes problematic as a result of a recent tendency toward the strategic 
use of lone actors.29 Understanding the nature of threat narratives promulgated by the extreme right is 
important in an effort to better protect those that are the targets of their ideology, and potentially 
develop effective counter-narrative policies and practices.
Methodology
The objective of this research was to determine whether Rapoport’s ‘wave’ theory can be applied to the 
transnational, transhistorical evolution of the extreme-right. Throughout the research, three broad 
threat narratives were uncovered which were found to correspond to Campion’s Australian three- 
wave framework. Therefore, a subsequent objective was to determine the applicability of Campion’s 
three phases to the international extreme right-wing milieu. Rapoport’s initial ‘Four Waves’ study was 
undertaken utilizing observational case studies and prominent trends across various times and 
locations. Campion’s identification of the three narratives, each expanding and contracting across 
time, provides an empirical basis upon which to anchor this research. It was hypothesized that similar, 
if not identical, threat narratives would be observed internationally.
In seeking to test this hypothesis, this research is based upon a case study analysis similarly, though 
not identically, framed to Rapoport’s initial work. The three selected case studies comprise of the three 
threat narratives proposed by Campion resultant from her research in Australia. Specifically, the cases 
are the anti-communist threat narrative, the anti-immigration threat narrative and the anti-Islam 
threat narrative. While databases such as the Global Terrorism Database or the Terrorism in Western 
Europe: Event Data (TWEED) can be helpful in providing data for quantitative studies, the specific 
circumstances surrounding attacks such as motivating ideology or justification for the attack are not 
recorded. In an attempt to overcome these limitations, a case study analysis will be insightful. While 
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case study analyses have historically been criticized,30 the subjective nature of terrorism studies, and 
more specifically threat narratives, renders this type of research particularly useful in this context.
Additionally, the research aims to provide a descriptive account of corresponding international rhetoric 
and attacks in an attempt to identify patterns and provide insight for future phases. The selected incidents 
discussed within each case represent a variety of groups across a number of countries, and in many of the U. 
S.A. cases, first-hand accounts are available,31 which will provide a rich basis for analysis. In an effort to 
contribute to the existing literature, a qualitative, case study analysis focusing on three threat narratives over 
the past seventy years was undertaken. The analysis identified a number of incidents where a dominant 
threat narrative was espoused as the ideological justification of right-wing terrorist or extremist attacks. The 
incidents selected demonstrate that the fluctuating nature and international presence of the varying 
narratives resembles the ‘wave’ concept championed by Rapoport.32 Notwithstanding, the author acknowl-
edges that this study is not free of limitations. As will be discussed in the following pages, Campion’s 
narratives do not encapsulate all extreme right-wing threat narratives across time and location, but merely 
encompass those narratives that, as per Rapoport’s ‘wave’ theory, reflect a noticeable expansion and 
subsequent contraction internationally.
Key terms and definitions
An effective analysis of the extreme right and its manifestations relies upon a sound understanding of 
exactly what constitutes the extreme right and what it, as a movement, aims to achieve. The terrorism 
studies field abounds with differing definitions of various terms and few, if any, are widely accepted. 
Terminology utilized in this paper including right-wing extremism, and terrorism will be defined and 
explained to clarify the intended meaning.
The term right-wing extremism is subject to much debate. Jackson defines right-wing activity as that 
which “in reaction to perceptions of negative change, aims to revert fundamental features of the political 
system to some imagined (though not necessarily imaginary) past state.”33 In contrast, Koehler understands 
the extreme right to mean “an overlapping web of groups and ideologies based on racially, ethnically or 
culturally defined superiority of one group and inferiority of all others.”34 Jackson’s definition raises the 
important assertion that the nature of right-wing terrorism is inherently reactionary.35 Additionally, 
although narrower in scope by stipulating specific grievances, Koehler’s definition touches upon the very 
premise of the ‘right.’ That is, that this term stems from the French Revolution where those in favor of class 
equality sat to the king’s left, and those opposing, to the right.36 While these definitions have made 
significant contributions to the field, both result in conceptualizations which may not encompass certain 
acts of right-wing extremism. Carter’s conceptualization is somewhat broader, having considered a number 
of definitions in an attempt to define right-wing extremism and radicalism.37 She proposes a minimal 
definition of right-wing extremism/radicalism as: “an ideology that encompasses authoritarianism, anti- 
democracy and exclusionary and/or holistic nationalism.”38 It is important to note that while anti- 
government rhetoric and action is often a feature of right-wing terrorism,39 it is not discussed at length 
in this paper. Anti-government sentiment is observed across all types of terrorism; the government as 
a target was recently attributed more to left-wing and jihadist terrorists than right-wing,40 and it is therefore 
generally excluded from discussions here. It should also be noted at this point that the inherent nature of 
extreme right-wing beliefs as articulated in Carter’s definition remain prominent throughout the waves 
discussed within this paper; it is the threat narrative and therefore, target, that changes in a cyclical manner 
as right-wing extremism and terrorism evolve.
As this paper focuses not just upon right-wing extremism, but also right-wing terrorism, an 
understanding of the term terrorism is necessary. Due to its international nature, Richard English’s 
conceptualization of terrorism will be utilized. That is,
Terrorism involves heterogeneous violence used or threatened with a political aim; it can involve a variety of acts, 
of targets, and of actors; it possesses an important psychological dimension, producing terror or fear among 
a directly threatened group and also a wider implied audience in the hope of maximizing political communication 
and achievement; it embodies the exerting and implementing of power, and the attempted redressing of power- 
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relations; it represents a subspecies of warfare, and as such it can form part of a wider campaign of violent and 
nonviolent attempts at political leverage.41
Therefore, right-wing terrorism will be any action fitting the above description of terrorism, where the 
purpose of the conduct is to advance a cause in accordance with the definition of right-wing extremism 
outlined above.
The Australian context
Underpinning this research is Campion’s article titled A ‘Lunatic Fringe’? The Persistence of Right-Wing 
Terrorism in Australia.42 The paper is based in empirical and primary source material and demonstrates 
a three-phase framework applicable to the Australian context of right-wing extremism and terrorism. 
Campion’s research illuminates three phases evident in the Australian right-wing milieu, where groups and 
actors are “imperilled by . . . designated out-groups”43 identified as Bolshevik Communism, pluralism and 
immigration, and finally, ethnic Australians and the Muslim community. The following section will 
highlight some of the groups and individuals involved in each phase as argued by Campion.
Campion finds that between the 1940s and 1960s, the National Socialist Party of Australia (NSPA) 
and the Australian League of Rights were the most conspicuous in promoting an anti-communist 
agenda.44 The Australian League of Rights were invited to join the World Anti-Communist League 
comprising of groups from Canada and Britain, but were expelled after their leader proclaimed an 
international communist conspiracy.45 During this era, Australian political activities were promoted 
overseas by the World Union of National Socialists (WUNS), praising the Australian National Socialist 
Party (ANSP) for covering anti-war demonstrators with red dye.46 Notwithstanding the apparent 
benign nature of these groups, the extremist rhetoric was clear and as a result they were, at the time, 
considered a threat by Australia’s domestic intelligence agency.47
The shift from anti-communist sentiment toward anti-immigrant sentiment came in the form of 
the abolition of the White Australia Policy in 1975. Australian extremist right-wing groups Australian 
Nationalist Movement (ANM), and The Australian League of Rights promulgated acts of violence 
against immigrant groups. Formed in 1985, the ANM was most active in Perth, Western Australia, 
posting propaganda in the form of flyers in various locations around the city, emphasizing their anti- 
immigration beliefs. Statements such as “Asians out or racial war,” and “40,000 jobless, 400,000 Asians 
out!” were observed posted around Perth.48 The ANM did not stop at racist posters, perpetrating 
a number of arson attacks on symbolic targets such as Asian restaurants.49 Campion further describes 
the final straw for law enforcement as a bomb attack on yet another Asian restaurant, Ko Sing.50 No 
one was injured, but the damages amounted to 50,000 USD. The leader of the ANM, Jack Van 
Tongeren was arrested, charged and convicted of fifty-three offenses. Upon sentencing, the judge 
remarked that his actions amounted to a “terrorist campaign and . . . a guerrilla war against the 
public.”51 The increase in acceptance of Vietnamese refugees in the 1970s, along with the recession of 
the early 1980s enhanced the perception that Asian immigration into Australia posed a threat.52 These 
contentious issues were the basis of the creation of legitimate, far-right political party Pauline 
Hanson’s One Nation Party in Australia. The face of the party, Pauline Hanson, expressed concern 
that Australia was being “swamped by Asians” in her maiden speech upon winning a seat in the House 
of Representatives.53 This phase of activity continued until the attacks on September 11, 2001.
Since these attacks, a large increase in incidents of discrimination against Muslims was observed in 
Australia.54 In 2016, Pauline Hanson’s One Nation party won four seats in the Senate, on this occasion 
citing Islam as a significant threat to Australian society.55 Hanson has since infamously walked into the 
Senate while wearing a burqa in her efforts to have the Islamic attire banned.56 This rhetoric has also 
appeared within one of many Australian right-wing extremist groups, the United Patriots Front (UPF). In 
2015, the group participated in a demonstration protesting the erection of a mosque in Bendigo, Victoria, 
with UPF leader Blair Cottrell yelling into a microphone, “you can either be a Muslim OR an Australian; it 
must be either/or because the two do not co-relate and do not correspond.”57 These examples highlight the 
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ideology and discourse underpinning right-wing extremism in the current era. But groups like the UPF, 
including Lads Society and Antipodean Resistance, have not planned or perpetrated any acts of terrorism. In 
terms of terrorism, it is lone actors that pose a more significant threat, as is evident in the Christchurch 
attack. Brenton Tarrant, from Grafton, New South Wales, killed fifty-one Muslims during Friday prayers in 
Christchurch, New Zealand. His manifesto, published online prior to the attack, asserted that his motiva-
tion was “anti-Islamic”58 and that he wanted “to directly reduce immigration rates to European lands by 
intimidating and physically removing the invaders themselves.”59 Although Tarrant cites anti-immigration 
on a number of occasions, he interchangeably uses the terms immigrant and Muslim, and thus it is argued 
here that his motivation and ideology is inherently anti-Islamic. Furthermore, he had previously been 
a vocal supporter of Cottrell and the UPF, and had direct conversations with the leaders, who attempted to 
recruit him.60 Additionally, it is made clear that his attack is designed to achieve retribution for those 
harmed in terrorist attacks perpetrated on behalf of an Islamic extremist ideology.61 Right-wing terrorism 
in and from Australia in the current era is transparent in its anti-Islam discourse.
The phases described by Campion in Australia are comparable to the waves observed by Rapoport. 
There is a distinctive rise and decline of right-wing activity in response to different perceived threats. There 
are common themes as well as various groups acting within each wave. In seeking to identify the phases of 
the extreme right using the ‘wave’ notion, an exploration of the prevailing sentiment in America and 
various European countries follows in an attempt to identify corresponding phases internationally. In 
considering the international nature of terrorism, it was hypothesized that similar narratives would be 
observed internationally. Indeed, Campion identified a number of occasions where Australian right-wing 
extremists and terrorists were communicating with groups internationally throughout all phases.62 Thus, 
Campion’s research provides an insightful framework upon which to anchor this study.
Anti-communism
Waves of terrorist activity are generally catalyzed by international events.63 Belew contends that the origin 
of what she terms the “white power” movement in the U.S.A. can be traced back to the “aftermath of the 
Vietnam War.”64 Despite this assertion, there is clearly extreme right-wing activity during the war. For 
example, in 1972, Robert Mathews created a group called Sons of Liberty, and in a propaganda video 
documented by Hamm, warned that America would be overrun by communists, the government would 
collapse and in response his group was preparing for guerrilla war.65 While not a veteran, Mathews was 
impacted by stories of the Vietnam War causing a disenchantment with the State,66 and a subsequent 
determination to take matters into his own hands. While the Sons of Liberty group was never known to 
commit terrorist acts, members of the KKK certainly were. Generally regarded for its white supremacist 
views, during this era,67 the KKK clearly espoused an anti-communist agenda and perpetrated terrorist 
attacks to that end. The combination of white supremacist and anti-communist views is elucidated in David 
Duke’s Knights of the Ku Klux Klan’s (KKKK) mass shooting in 1979. Five communist protesters partaking 
in a rally were shot and killed by Klan members,68 in what Belew describes as an era where right-wing 
groups were united by common neo-Nazi and anti-communist sentiment.69 Prominent right-wing activists 
at the time, whose legacy continues today, urged followers to continue fighting the Vietnam War upon their 
return to America. In his 1983 work titled Essays of a Klansman, Louis Beam called upon the three million 
Vietnam veterans in America to rise up against the government, whom he labeled as “traitors,” “criminals” 
and “bastards.”70 Beam himself epitomizes the link between white supremacy and the dominant extreme 
right-wing political discourse throughout the anti-communist wave. Belew contends that a significant 
change occurred in the U.S.A. extreme right-wing movement in 1983,71 and it is argued that this 
observation coincides with a transformation of the dominant political discourse from anti-communism 
to the next wave: anti-immigration.
Before moving to a discussion of the next wave, it is important to obtain a holistic view of groups 
espousing anti-communist beliefs in an international context. Complementary to Belew’s U.S.A.- 
focused research, a number of right-wing extremist groups propagating a dominant anti-communist 
ideology can be observed internationally between the beginning of the Vietnam War in 1955 and the 
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mid-1980s. This aligns with Rapoport’s ‘wave’ theory in terms of the similar political discourse 
observed internationally. Hoffman’s note commissioned by the RAND corporation in 1982 typifies 
the anti-communist ideology held by groups around the world at the time.72 In Italy, The Ordine 
Nuovo (Italian for “New Order”) was one of the predominant fascist groups between the 1960s and 
1980s.73 The Ordine Nuovo was described as having strong anti-Semitic, anti-communist views74 and 
when they were officially banned in 1973, rebranded as Ordine Nero (Black Order). In 1974, the group 
was responsible for the bombing of a train traveling to Bologna, killing twelve. Following the attack, 
the group issued the controversial statement, “the Nazi flag . . . still lives for a powerful Nazi Italy.”75 
Despite the overt anti-Semitic views, this and subsequent attacks were believed to be in reaction to the 
communist mayor of the city.76 Additionally, the Nuclei of Armed Revolutionaries (NAR) were held 
responsible for at least twenty-five attacks over the limited time that they were active.77 Examples of 
terrorist attacks perpetrated by the NAR include the bombing of the Italian Communist Party offices 
in 1977,78 and the Bologna train station bombing in 1980 which killed eighty-five.79 Furthermore, in 
1984, both the NAR and Ordine Nero collaborated to commit a second bombing of a train headed to 
Bologna, killing fifteen and injuring 112.80 The attacks committed by the NAR and Ordine Nero were 
predominantly anti-communist in nature, supporting the argument that the anti-communist wave 
existed transnationally.
In Germany, where many terrorist attacks between 1950 and 1985 were perpetrated on the basis of anti- 
Semitic rhetoric and ideology lingering from the Second World War,81 there were still a number of attacks 
targeting communist entities. The Wehrsportgruppe Hengst (Military Sports Group Hengst) is understood 
to be the first right-wing extremist entity in Germany.82 In 1968, the founding member of the group, Bernd 
Hengst, shot at the German Communist Party office building with a firearm.83 Three years later, Hengst 
was arrested for the attack, and located with extensive plans for further acts of terrorism, including attacks 
on the German Social Democrat Party which, at the time, opposed the right-leaning National Democratic 
Party of Germany.84 Furthermore, a group known as the Europaische Befreiungsfront (European Liberation 
Front; EBF) has been described as being formed as a direct response to combat communism.85 While many 
EBF group members were arrested in 1970 following an investigation into a planned terrorist attack on 
critical infrastructure,86 one member, Ekkehard Weil, avoided arrest and continued promulgating his cause 
alone. In 1970, Weil shot and injured a Soviet soldier, and in 1979, committed an arson attack on the 
Socialist Unity Party West Berlin.87 Both attacks were undoubtedly symbolic, targeting Weil’s perceived 
threat: communism. Following a short stint in jail, Weil escaped, and in the early 1980s bombed Jewish 
shops and homes.88 These attacks reinforce not only the notion that an anti-communist ideology existed in 
extreme right-wing groups around the world during this time period, but also that themes of anti-Semitism, 
Nazism and white supremacy remained prevalent.
True to Rapoport’s theory, political change or unexpected political outcomes can catalyze a decline 
in the previous wave and precede a new wave. Events such as the end of the Cold War and the 
collapsing Soviet Union coincided with mass emigration into the U.S.A. and Europe.89 These globally 
significant events influenced international political outcomes, and resulted in changes in the animat-
ing energy of extreme right-wing groups and individuals.
Anti-immigration
There is a clear, international, shift in political (and therefore extremist)90 rhetoric in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s from anti-communist themes to anti-immigration themes. While some suggest that 
immigration continues to be a perceived threat to right-wing extremists,91 it is argued herein that there 
is a distinction between anti-immigrant sentiment and anti-Muslim or anti-Islam sentiment. In the 
following section, much of the extremist and terrorist violence and rhetoric discussed is directed 
toward immigrants of Asian, or other descent, with no regard for their religion.
The transformation toward an anti-immigration agenda in the U.S.A. is noticeable in the Californian 
KKK, headed by Thomas Metzger, who won the Democratic Primary, vying for a seat in Congress.92 
Although unsuccessful in Congress, his successful campaign in the primary’s in 1980 emphasized the threat 
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of Asian immigration,93 which, along with Latin American immigration, had been on the rise for a number 
of years.94 Metzger’s early anti-immigrant tendencies are evident in the California KKK’s “Border Watch” 
group in 1977.95 The stated purpose of the group was to “stem the tide of illegal immigrants into the United 
States.”96 It has been proven that a strong nationwide anti-immigrant sentiment had begun to appear both 
in political and news media rhetoric from 1980 onwards in the U.S.A.97 The culmination was the enactment 
of the Immigration Reform and Control Act 1986 which criminalized illegal immigration as well as 
strengthening border security. This legislation likely consolidated the threat perceived by right-wing 
extremist groups. This assertion is supported by a quantitative study which examined extreme right- 
wing victimology between 1990 and 2008, indicating that the main target of extreme right-wing actors 
during this period, comprising 51 percent, was racial and ethnic minorities.98 Two years after the enactment 
of the Immigration Reform legislation, members of a group named East Side White Pride attacked three 
Ethiopian immigrants, killing one.99 Links were drawn between the perpetrators of the attacks and 
Metzger’s White Aryan Resistance (WAR); the attack was motivated by racism and by the WAR 
narrative.100 While the socio-political context at the national level likely shaped the local manifestation of 
anti-immigrant informed extremism in the U.S.A., the threat is observed globally through this period.
In Germany, a study by Koehler elucidates the victim groups targeted by right-wing terrorists.101 Second 
only to government targets, which Koehler argues is historically a consistent target of right-wing groups, 
foreigners were the most frequently targeted between 1980 and 1989. A dramatic increase in attacks on 
foreigners is also documented in the study; specifically, the increase occurred between the periods 
1963–1979 (0 percent) and 1980–1989 (36.4 percent).102 McGowan’s study complements this data, descrip-
tively outlining incidents perpetrated against immigrants in Germany during the same time periods.103 In 
order to understand the issue taken with immigrants in Germany, a holistic view of government policy 
provides a contextual background. Following the Second World War, Germany signed agreements with 
Italy, Spain, Turkey, Morocco and the Yugoslav Republic, enabling immigration from these regions.104 
Then, between 1980 and 1992, the numbers of asylum seekers grew dramatically as a result of the Yugoslav 
War.105 An escalation of right-wing extremist and terrorist attacks upon immigrants subsequently occurred. 
For example, five bombings were perpetrated by the Deutsche Aktionsgruppe (German Action Group) in 
1980; all but one of which targeted those assisting foreign settlers in Germany.106 Even with prominent 
political events such as reunification occurring in Germany in 1991, right-wing extremist groups continued 
to propagate, recruit, and perpetrate terrorist attacks upon immigrants and asylum seekers as their primary 
targets. Between 1991 and 1992 there were over 4,000 attacks upon asylum seekers and foreigners by right- 
wing extremists.107 While many would be considered hate crimes, or low level, lone actor attacks, many were 
perpetrated with a political motivation and thus, meet the definition of terrorism provided above. For 
example, in August 1992, demonstrations were undertaken outside an asylum seeker’s home calling for 
“foreigners out” and “Germany for Germans” before Molotov cocktails were thrown inside.108 Zeskind’s 
description aptly illuminates the extent of the terror perpetrated by right-wing extremists during this period: 
“for several moments it seemed as if all Germany would be engulfed in the flames of burning refugee 
hostels.”109
The international anti-immigrant ideology and politically motivated violence observed in right- 
wing extremist rhetoric and attacks between the early 1980s and early 2000s clearly meets Rapoport’s 
definition of a wave. There is an overt, dominant threat narrative energizing the activity which 
expanded throughout the era. There is similar activity occurring simultaneously on an international 
scale. The wave continued until the most dramatic catalyst; September 11, 2001.
Anti-Islam
The attacks on September 11, 2001 served as the international event energizing the next wave of right- 
wing terrorism. The attacks magnified the out-group perceived by the extreme right; the foundation of 
the new threat was religion. Al Qaeda subsequently claimed responsibility for the attacks, citing a Salafi 
interpretation of the Islamic religion as justification.110 Following these attacks, the extreme right-wing 
rhetoric slowly transformed, identifying Muslims and Islam as the perceived threat.111 While some tout 
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the FBI statistics of hate crimes increasing by 1600 percent after the September 11 attacks,112 it is 
conceded in this paper that not all hate crimes meet the definition of terrorism. Notwithstanding, there is 
still a definitive expansion in activity internationally, particularly in the second decade of the anti-Islam 
wave. Also notable is a significant difference in the tactics utilized by terrorists in the current wave, with 
anti-Islam groups differing significantly to their previous-era counterparts.113 While groups are still seen 
to form, expand, and decline, consistent with Rapoport’s waves theory, they are less likely to plan and 
commit acts of terrorism themselves. The groups provide the motivation and rhetoric which normalizes 
an attack; lone actors, linked directly or indirectly to extremist groups, plan and perpetrate it. It is 
important to note at this point that much of the literature surrounding the current-era right-wing 
extremists still utilizes the term anti-immigrant. This paper seeks to delineate the difference between 
violence motivated by anti-immigration in contrast to anti-Islamic rhetoric.
The expansion of the anti-Islam movement in the United Kingdom (UK) is apparent in the creation 
of new groups such as the English Defense League (EDL). Formed in 2009, the EDL is vocally “against 
Islamic extremism.”114 Despite their claim of solely taking issue with extremism, Kassimeris and 
Jackson’s study debunks this notion, citing a delineation between a Muslim out-group and non- 
Muslim in-group as proof of Islamophobia.115 The EDL’s espoused views, along with low-level crimes 
against both Muslim youths116 and Islamic prayer halls117 suggests a confirmation of Kassimeris and 
Jackson’s contention. Additionally, a similar relationship can be observed between the EDL and lone 
actor terrorism. In June 2017, Darren Osborne hired a van and drove into a crowd of Muslims leaving 
a Finsbury Park mosque after prayer, killing one and injuring twelve others.118 It was reported during 
his trial that he had been in contact with EDL leader Tommy Robinson, as well as engaged with online 
content from both the EDL and Britain First movements.119
A further demonstration of the anti-Islam wave can be seen in the notorious attacks in Norway in 
2011. Norwegian man Anders Behring Breivik detonated a car bomb outside a government building 
killing eight, before traveling to Utøya island dressed as a police officer where he murdered sixty-nine 
Labor Party youth camp members, most of whom were teenagers.120 In terms of his tactics, Breivik 
denounced the connectedness of terrorist groups, and emphasized the importance of conducting attacks 
alone, in order to maximize efficacy.121 Therefore, it would have been expected that in contrast to 
Tarrant and Osborne, no links would be found. On the contrary, despite this emphasis, Gardell’s study 
of the attack indicates that Breivik had around 600 members of the EDL as friends on Facebook, and 
that many of his British manifesto recipients were members of either the EDL or the British National 
Party.122 Furthermore, Breivik had engaged with the extreme right-wing discourse from both extremist 
groups and political parties including the Norwegian Progress Party and Swedish Democratic Party, 
referring to, and defending, both widely in his manifesto.123 In the introductory paragraph of his work, 
Breivik specifies his perceived threat, “[t]he compendium . . . documents through more than 1000 pages 
that the fear of Islamization is all but irrational.”124 He is virulently anti-Islam, the very epitome of this 
wave.
While further groups and individuals whose actions support the notion of a right-wing wave theory 
exist elsewhere around the globe, it is contended that the few examples highlighted here sufficiently 
prove that inferences can be drawn, and that Rapoport’s ‘wave’ theory adequately frames the interna-
tional evolution of right-wing activity.
Findings and conclusion
While many have attempted to predict what the next wave may be,125 it is near impossible to preempt 
a future wave due to the inherently unpredictable nature of any future catalyst.126 The following 
provides trends and patterns observed as a result of this study, including a discussion of one of the 
major differences between Rapoport’s waves and the right-wing waves that are contended here.
Firstly, as previously touched upon throughout this paper, there are consistent themes under-
pinning the right-wing extremist ideology. As identified and discussed, in each era, a number of 
groups and organizations are observed to form, propagate and act on behalf of the prevailing anti- 
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communist, anti-immigration or anti-Islam rhetoric. However, groups have also perpetrated attacks 
purely on behalf of the consistent doctrines of white supremacy, neo-Nazism and/or anti-Semitism. 
For example, The Order’s most prominent attack was the assassination of Jewish radio host Alan 
Berg.127 The others on the so-called “kill-list” were showing African Americans in a positive light,128 
illuminating an underlying racist justification for terrorist attacks. The white supremacist vision is 
further illuminated in Robert Mathews’ purchase of a surrogacy program in Portland.129 Additionally, 
actors within the groups propagating the anti-communist, anti-immigration or anti-Islam doctrine 
can also hold the underlying white supremacist, neo-Nazi and/or anti-Semitic views, and still be 
included in the specified wave. For example, UPF leader Blair Cottrell had previously called for all 
classrooms to display a photograph of Adolf Hitler, signifying his neo-Nazi views.130 It is clear that 
groups and individuals can commit attacks using more than one ideology for justification.131 Further 
research could potentially illuminate features of groups that primarily hold an ideology relating to the 
aforementioned waves, in contrast to groups primarily espousing the underlying views. Many who 
study the extreme right have created typologies which include White Supremacy as an underpinning 
doctrine.132 However, this paper has attempted to set apart the cyclical nature of the anti-communist, 
anti-immigration and anti-Islam waves, in opposition to the constant tenets seen throughout. 
A corresponding notion can be observed in Rapoport’s theory, where he indicates that nationalism 
is observed throughout all waves.133 Additionally, as touched upon previously, anti-government 
attacks are evident throughout the waves analyzed here. Examples include the bombings in Bologna 
which, as discussed, were presumably perpetrated due to the communist Mayor.134 While anti- 
government rhetoric is present throughout the waves, it is argued here that it does not conform to 
the ‘wave’ analogy. There is no observable expansion, no increase in group numbers and government 
entities are more often utilized as a target to increase notoriety rather than defined as a designated 
enemy. Consequently, this research results in a slightly different application of Rapoport’s original 
conceptualization. It is argued that there are multiple ideologically consistent tenets throughout all the 
waves. Nonetheless, the perceived threat causes an observable expansion throughout waves, with the 
creation and subsequent decline of groups on a transnational scale, rendering Rapoport’s model 
applicable to the right-wing milieu.
Secondly, the ideology from each wave lingers. Parker and Sitter have suggested that the wave 
concept is too simple, and that historical similarities can be observed throughout all waves, across both 
tactics and ideology.135 This conclusion can also be drawn across right-wing waves, evident in 
Tarrant’s Facebook comments on the UPF Facebook page stating, “communists will get what they 
get.”136 Although this was not the primary motivation for Tarrant’s attack, the anti-communist notion 
is still present and confirms the analysis in the previous paragraph: that attacks can be perpetrated 
using justification of multiple ideologies. Additionally, Breivik blames communism for the current 
state of the world in his manifesto.137 It is clear that the anti-immigration and anti-Islam waves are 
strongly interconnected, with much of the perceived threat originating from multiculturalism and 
pluralism. However, the anti-immigrant rhetoric is elucidated in Patrick Crusius’ manifesto, citing his 
motivation for the shooting attack as fear of an “Hispanic invasion of Texas.”138 It is worth noting that 
while Crusius targeted a different class of victims (Hispanics, not Muslims), his attack is closely linked 
with Tarrant’s in terms of the concept of white genocide.139 It is also important to remember 
Rapoport’s assertion surrounding the commonality of local aims within waves.140 These observations 
may denote a trend toward the next wave and should not be discounted when analyzing potential 
future attacks.
Thirdly, in accordance with Rapoport’s assertion that local aims influence right-wing rhetoric and 
attacks, each threat narrative discussed here is applied and used by extreme right-wing groups and 
individuals in a nuanced manner. Extreme right-wing actors in the first wave perceived a threat 
emanating from Communism, manifested through international participation in the Vietnam War. 
Thus, much of the sentiment is specifically Vietnam related as seen across all examples in this paper. 
The second threat narrative is applied in a slightly different manner dependent on locality. As evident 
in the above examples, groups active in Australia within the anti-immigration era tended to focus on 
10 A. HART
Asians, whereas threat narratives in the U.S.A. also encompassed Hispanics and Latinos. Furthermore, 
another individualistic feature throughout the waves is the tactics employed by various actors inter-
nationally. The examples in this paper illuminate a dependence on weapons availability; the UK is 
subject to far more stringent firearms legislation than the US, and thus, as seen in the anti-Islam 
example, extreme right-wing actors in the UK used a vehicle to perpetrate their attack. A more 
infamous example is that of Tarrant, who indicated that he perpetrated his attack in New Zealand 
because of the ease of access to fully automatic firearms.141 Despite the nuanced nature of the 
application of the threat narratives to attacks in varying countries, the periods of activity arguably 
align with Rapoport’s ‘wave’ theory by conforming to the “common predominant energy.”142
Fourthly, one of the most important trends observable throughout this study has been that the number 
of attacks perpetrated on behalf of right-wing ideology tends to accelerate dependent on national and 
international events. This directly correlates with Rapoport’s description of waves in that there is an 
observable expansion. It further supports assertions about the reactionary nature of right-wing 
terrorism.143 As demonstrated in the three waves identified within this paper, the largest number of attacks 
tend to occur in response to action by their perceived threat. For example, the anti-Islam wave saw a 320 
percent increase in right-wing attacks between 2014 and 2018,144 correlating to the more active years of the 
Islamic State. The trend is also seen within the anti-immigration and anti-communist waves, with many 
attacks observed in response to higher levels of immigration, and greater perceived threat from communist 
government entities. This observation holds serious implications for law enforcement and security 
agencies; where extremist right-wing activity appears to wane, it will undoubtedly return with 
a vengeance dependent on oppositional activity and perceived threat.
Finally, there is a key difference in right-wing waves in contrast with Rapoport’s waves. As observed 
within the case studies, right-wing waves typically endure for approximately twenty years. It is suggested 
that this is a result of changing global political landscapes. Rapoport concedes that the third ‘New Left 
Wave’ lasted for approximately twenty-five years, arguing that its decline is intertwined with the end of the 
Vietnam War, significant international legislative changes and enhanced law enforcement capability.145 It is 
argued here that significant global political events including the end of the Vietnam War, collapse of the 
Soviet Union, and sweeping legislative changes arguably consolidating a perceived threat of extremist Islam 
following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, fundamentally changed the threat perceived by each 
wave of the extreme right, causing a decline in the previous wave. Despite this identified difference, 
Rapoport’s model is still applicable to the right-wing milieu. The conceptualization, if anything, has great 
utility in understanding threat trends beyond its initial application.
In sum, corresponding with Campion’s research, there have been three definitive waves of extreme 
right-wing activity observed internationally, both in discourse and terrorist action. First, the anti- 
communist wave resulted in right-wing terrorist attacks targeting communist organizations, political 
members, or as seen in Italy, civilians in transportation hubs. Second, as this wave declined, a new 
wave of groups targeted immigrants of various nationalities, dependent on the country. Immigrants 
and asylum seekers were attacked and, in some cases, killed. Finally, the anti-Islam wave was catalyzed 
by the Al Qaeda attacks in September 2001 and further propelled by the rise of Islamic State in 2014. 
Attacks have focuses on Muslims, with two of the most lethal attacks perpetrated by lone actors 
Anders Breivik and Brenton Tarrant in this wave. To provide further analysis of each case, it was found 
that there exists underlying white supremacist, neo-Nazi, or anti-Semitic tenets in each wave, and 
there are attacks which rely on a dual-threat justification; there is a change in tactics tending toward 
a greater use of lone actors; the ideology from each wave lingers; right-wing activity accelerates in 
reaction to national and international political catalytic events; and that each wave typically lasts for 
twenty years. The key findings of this research conclude that Rapoport’s ‘wave’ theory adequately 
frames the cyclical nature of right-wing activity over the past seventy years. Groups and individuals are 
observed internationally, with similar activities occurring simultaneously. Specifically, this activity is 
documented on a transhistorical scale across Australia, the U.S.A. and in various European countries. 
The cusp of the next wave is upon us, with the global coronavirus pandemic a likely catalyst. Right- 
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wing terrorism is an increasingly dominant and enduring threat to society and must continue to be 
researched and investigated to ensure appropriate national security and law enforcement responses.‘
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